Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Sensory Impressions, philosophy: the concept of impression is intended to serve as a boundary to the concept of perception. It places the weight on information not yet processed on the side of the receiving subject. Perception, on the other hand, refers to prepared information, which allows classification, storage and evaluation. See also stimuli, perception, sensations, input, information, qualia._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David M. Armstrong on Sensory Impressions - Dictionary of Arguments
Place II 52 Sensory Experience/Place: sensory impressions cannot tell us that we are to introduce new categories or should banish old ones. - And yet, people have developed the language to organize their environment and describe, as it is dictated by their sense organs. - But a conceptual scheme ((s) needed for cateorization) is mind-dependent. ((s) >Cf >Categorization/Psychological theories, >Conceptual schemes.)_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
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> Counter arguments against Armstrong
> Counter arguments in relation to Sensory Impressions
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28